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Ten years ago the number of agricultural economists in Indonesia 
could be counted on the fingers of one hand, and there is still no 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics in the Indonesian government. Yet 
more than half of Indonesia's national production and exports originate 
in the agricultural sector, and more than two-thirds of its population 
earn their living in agriculture. It has long been realized, however, 
that no worthwhile economic development is possible unless satisfactory 
agricultural policies can be devised to cope with the problems of 
food shortages, marketing, land tenure and many more.
In the pre-1966 period, the policies adopted to solve the problems 
of agriculture, like those in the general economic field, were as 
often as not unsuccessful. However, there had been a growing realiza­
tion that research was a necessary prerequisite to the formulation 
of agricultural policies that would work, and, by 1963, first attempts 
had been made to establish a research organization to study the 
socio-economic problems of agriculture. It is not surprising that 
this approach had been suggested because Indonesia has long had a 
tradition of honoring men with trained minds.
In the event, an ad hoa research organization, the Agro-Economic 
Survey of Indonesia, was able to start work in 1966. All its staff 
were part timers, men whose "full time" jobs were at various uni­
versities. They spent from one-quarter to one-half of their time 
undertaking research projects commissioned by various government 
agencies. The men who did the research work were also for the most 
part inexperienced.
This article summarizes and interprets the results of the first 
five survey reports published in final form by the Agro-Economic 
Survey. It will be clear from what follows that these relatively 
inexperienced (their average age is 32 years), part time research 
workers have written reports which illuminate a wide range of problems 
facing the development of Indonesian agriculture.1 *S.
1. The five reports on which this article is based are: Mubyarto,
et. al. , ,Usahatani Tebu dan Industri Gula di Djawa (Bogor: S.A.E.I., 
1968J7 Irian Soejono, Program "Bimas" Sebagai Pendorong Modernisasi 
Usahatani (Bogor: S.A.E.lT, 1968); Wirjadi Prawirodihardjo,
Peranan Ekonomi Perusahaan-Perusahaan Pengolah Padi di Djawa 
Chususnja Didua Kabupaten di Djawa Barat (Bogor: S.A.E.I., 1968) ;
R. S. Sinaga and Faisal Kasryno, Pengusahaan dan Tataniaga 
Karet Rakjat di Sumatera Selatan dan Kalimantan Selatan (Bogor:
S. A.E.I., 1968) ; and Moeljono Partosoedarso and Amris Makmur,
Tata Produksi dan Niaga Kopi di Indonesia (Bogor: S.A.E.I.,
1968) . These reports are the first in a series entitled Laporan 
issued by the Survey Agro-Ekonomi.
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The Agro-Economic Survey: Some General Information2
In a general introduction to the reports, Professor Sajogyo,3 
Chairman of the Working Body of the Survey since its inception, writes 
that in the first two and one-half years, fifteen field studies and 
two other studies have been undertaken. "* He also reports that the 
total cost of these seventeen studies has been only Rp.5.3 million 
(U.S. $40,000) at most.5 It is always difficult for economists and 
other social scientists to know whether the research work they do is 
worth what it costs, but in the report on smallholder rubber, for 
example, the authors show how Indonesia's national income could have 
been increased by some $150 million a year through an almost costless 
change in patterns of resource use. Elsewhere in this report, and 
in the others, there are many other hints and suggestions about how 
Indonesia's scarce economic resources can be better employed.
All the studies were undertaken at the request of various govern­
ment agencies and at their expense, and it may be assumed that the 
most interested readers in each case were the officials of these 
agencies. In his introduction, Professor Sajogyo stresses that in­
formation obtained through these field studies is intended primarily 
to supplement what the government already receives from such sources 
as the Central Statistical Bureau, National Sample Surveys and regular 
Departmental Reports. The field studies, then, represent a major 
research effort with the rather limited goal of getting detailed 
information on specific and well-defined problems. In all cases, the 
first aim of each study was to collect the information needed to test 
hypotheses relating to particular socio-economic problems in the 
agricultural field. The special strength of the approach adopted is 
the conviction that the most useful supplementary information is that 
collected directly from the primary actors in economic life--farmers, 
local officials, mill managers and traders. The validity and useful­
ness of this approach should become amply clear from what follows.6
2. For further details on the organization of the Survey, see the 
article by E . de Vries, "The Agro-Economic Survey of Indonesia," 
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 5, No. 1 (1969), pp. 73- 
7T.
3. Until 1969, Sajogyo was known as Kampto Utomo.
4. The publication date given on the five reports discussed here is 
NoArember 1968, but, in fact, the reports came out at irregular 
intervals during 1969. Copies may be obtained from the Agro- 
Economic Survey, Djl. Merdeka 99, Bogor, Indonesia. It is also 
planned to publish English language versions of the reports.
5. The exchange rate varied over the period from about Rp. 100 - $1 
to about Rp. 300 - $1.
6. Most of the field studies used the same research design. Professor 
Sajogyo has generalized the design and discussed its theoretical 
implications in "Penelitian Ilmu-Ilmu Kemasjarakatan dan 
Aplikasinja" (typescript, to be published as part of a book 
edited by Koentjaraningrat on social science research), pp. 22-
25.
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In his foreword to the series, Minister of Agriculture Dr. Tojib 
Hadiwidjaja notes that the major economic problems faced by Indo­
nesia are low per capita income, high man-land ratios (in Java in 
particular) and inflation. He notes also that the manifold problem 
of agricultural development cannot be solved without taking into 
account fully the great socio-economic diversity found in the rural 
areas. He stresses that every attempt should be made to ensure 
that Indonesia's very scarce economic resources are used as economical­
ly as possible.
It is, of course, impossible that these five reports can provide 
the answers to all, or even most, of the problems mentioned by 
Minister Tojib. But, when they are viewed as a whole, it is clear 
that this inexpensive, but well-executed research effort has provided 
ifivaluable information on many questions: how the Indonesian
economy has operated since independence; the scope for development; 
how government policies have affected economic activity; and 
why economic policies have taken the unproductive form they have.
The Environment for Economic Decision Making
Taken together, the reports provide a good picture of how the 
Indonesian economy has operated in the period from before World War II 
to about 1967. They also show a large number of the problems that 
need to be tackled by the government before farmers, traders and 
other decision makers in the economic field can be expected to act 
in a way conducive to sustained economic development.
An important problem in the Indonesian economy is that of 
regional and other discrepancies. As of October 1967, for example, 
a coffee farmer in East Java received a price equal to 60 percent 
of the New York price, while a coffee grower in South Sumatra re­
ceived only 38 percent.8 The interregional discrepancies for small­
holder rubber are even more marked: in South Kalimantan a grower
received 39 percent of the port price, while in South Sumatra he 
received only 19 percent.9 At the same time, the price of rice in 
South Kalimantan was Rp. 3.8 per kg.; whereas it was Rp. 21 in 
South Sumatra.10 Thus, rubber tappers, and rubber smallholders who
7. De Vries reports that a number of policy changes have been made, 
wholly or in part, as a result of the field studies undertaken 
by the Agro-Economic Survey, but most of these changes have come 
after the reports were first written, in 1967 and 1968. It is 
also clear that many of the policy changes recommended or implied 
have yet to be made. De Vries, "Agro-Economic Survey."
8. Partosoedarso, Tata Produksi dan Niaga Kopi, p. 126.
9. Sinaga, Pengusahaan Karet Rakjat, p. 49. The port price is the 
price at the point of export, for example, the dollar price 
ruling at Bandjarmasin (South Kalimantan) and Palembang (South 
Sumatra).
10. Ibid. , p . 35.
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did their own tapping, had to work ten times as hard in South Sumatra 
to earn a given level of real income, measured in terms of rice.
Rice and fertilizer prices in six villages in West Java were 
recorded in the study by Soejono on the Bimas program. The price of 
urea per kg. varied from Rp. 8 to Rp. 18; and the rice price per 
kg. varied from Rp. 6 to Rp. 12.50. 1
In the rice milling industry five very different techniques co­
exist. These processes differ in technical efficiency, from some 
70 kg. padi (unmilled rice) per man per hour to 10,000 kg. of padi 
per hour, and they also differ considerably one from the other in 
processing costs. 2
In /the sugar industry four "rental" systems were in use at the 
same time. The most favorable for the farmers gave them an income 
equivalent of 5 tons of milled rice per hectare, some 50 percent more 
than they would have obtained had they planted rice and other food 
crops, while the worst gave them an income of only 1.8 tons of rice.1 23 
The farmers in the sugar growing areas were also at times able to 
choose between selling the sugar they received in part payment for 
the use of their land on the free market at Rp. 15 per kg. or to the 
mills at the fixed government price of Rp. 4.65 per kg.1^
Another problem experienced by the farmer is price instability. 
The rubber-rice price ratio faced by rubber smallholders ranged from 
0.5 to 2 in the period from 1953 to 1966 (three year averages).15 16
The same sorts of instabilities were faced by coffee growers, for, 
whereas one kilogram of coffee would usually buy 3-4 kilograms of 
rice, it was enough to buy only one kilogram of rice at the end of 
1967. 1 6
The farmers in the sugar areas who rented land to the mills 
under the then dominant cash rent system received rents that varied 
greatly from year to year. According to the formula, however, they 
were supposed to get the same amount in rice terms each year. In 
the period 1959 to 1963 the small landowners (average size of parcel 
was 0.3 hectare) received from a high of 29 percent of the rent cal­
culated according to the rental formula to a low of but 10 percent.17
11. Soejono, Program "Bimas," p. 100.
12. Prawirodihardjo, Perusahaan Pengolah Padi, p. 122.
13. Mubyarto, £t. al. , Usaha.tani Tebu, p. 48. The other two rental 
systems would have provided incomes of 2.8 and 2.4 tons respec­
tively, i.e., below what they could have earned from planting 
their land in rice.
!4. Ibid., p. 147.
15. Sinaga, Pengusahaan Karet Rakjat, p. 32. During the same period 
the rubber-rice price ratio on the Djakarta wholesale market 
never went below 1.9, and in one year was as high as 5.3. In the 
Singapore market the lowest figure recorded in the same period 
was 3.1.
16. Partosoedarso, Tata Produksi dan Niaga Kopi, p. 125.
17. Mubyarto, et. al., Usahatani Tebu, p. 8.
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Together with these more specific problems, the nation suffered 
a general economic decline. The number of operating rice mills in the 
country as a whole fell from 1,137 in 1940 to 880 in 1954 and to 758 
in 1967.18 19 In South Sumatra, the number of rubber smokehouses fell 
from about a thousand in the pre-war period to 125 in 1958 and to 
8 in 1963.1 9 The number of sugar mills also declined, from the pre­
war 178 to 55 in 1967.20
The yield of "estate" sugar likewise declined, from 17.3 tons 
(crystal) per hectare in 1935, to 9.8 tons (1954-1966) and to 7.6 tons 
per hectare in the five year period 1962-1966.21 This decline was 
accompanied by a decline in the quality of the land farmers were 
willing to rent to the sugar factories, and to a decline in their 
willingness to transfer the land-use rights at the time most suitable 
to the mills.22 2345
In the rice and rubber processing industries, however, the 
decline in productive capacity in the form of rice mills and rubber 
smokehouses was more than matched by an increase in the number of 
rice hullers and rubber remilling facilities. There had been no 
hullers on Java before the war, but there are now many thousands; 
meanwhile, the number of "remillings" in South Sumatra rose from 7 
in 1941 to 15 in 1958 and to 33 in 1963.2 3 Both hullers and 
"remillings" are much less economically efficient than the facilities 
they replaced, and the increases recorded here must also be regarded 
as further evidence of a decline in the efficiency of resource use.21*
The reports also indicate the continued seriousness of the 
problem of over-population on Java. For example, 60 percent of the 
farmers who rented land to the sugar factories indicated that they 
had no alternative employment opportunities during the sixteen months 
the land was in cane. 5 In the report on rice processing it was 
stressed that the highly inefficient method of hand-pounding (it is 
inefficient both technically and economically) should be retained as 
this is the only way that many people can make a living.26 It may
18. Prawirodihardjo, Perusahaan Pengolah Padi, p. 145.
19. Sinaga, Pengusahaan Karet Rakjat, p. 58.
20. Mubyarto, e_t. al. , Usahatani Tebu, p. 15. Very few new mills 
indeed were built for either rice or sugar after independence, 
and the decline in the number of operating mills is a good indi­
cator of the decline in processing capacity.
21. Ibid., p . 14.
22. Ibid. , p . 13.
23. Sinaga, Pengusahaan Karet Rakjat, p. 58.
24. Rice hullers can, without much difficulty, be converted into 
small rice mills.
25. Mubyarto, et^ . al. , Usahatani Tebu, p. 42.
26. Prawirodihardjo, Perusahaan Pengolah Padi, p. 127.
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well be assumed that this problem is even worse now than it was before 
the war.
Evidence of yet other problems the peasants have to contend with 
comes from the rubber study. For example, despite the very low rub­
ber-rice price ratio prevailing at the time the study was done, some 
80 percent of the growers interviewed in South Sumatra received 
prices for their rubber that were from 8 to 24 percent lower again 
because they were in debt.27 This report also shows that the small­
holders who depend to the greatest extent on rubber for their income 
have done the least new planting.28 The most serious problem they 
face, however, is the very small proportion of the port price that 
they receive, not more than 20 percent in the period April 1966 to 
August 1967. 9
The reports show again and again that farmers and other producers 
(including processors) are compelled to operate in a difficult and 
uncertain economic environment. It is therefore not surprising that 
the overall picture is one of economic deterioration. There are, 
however, a few bright spots. Farmers have continued to grow more rice 
even though domestic prices have generally been much lower than those 
that have ruled on the world market, and, in the export industries 
like rubber and coffee, the capacity to produce has continued to in­
crease despite the very unfavorable exchange rate policy. Indeed, in 
the period 1960 to 1966 the rate of planting of coffee was over 7 per­
cent per year in Lampung, and almost 6 percent a year in South 
Sumatra.30 For rubber, harder hit in terms of prices, the rates of 
increase were much lower, but still positive: 1.1 percent in South
Sumatra and 1.6 percent in South Kalimantan.31 There is no doubt 
that these rates of increase would have been much higher in all cases 
had prices been more favorable. It is also clear that even though 
the prices received by farmers were very low compared with the prices 
of the goods they bought, thus reducing incentives to increase pro­
duction, farmers were nonetheless still responsive to the price 
mechanism, in particular to price differentials (e.g., rice to sugar 
and rice to rubber).
Development Potentials
The willingness of farmers to respond to economic incentives, 
when they are provided, is probably the single most important basis 
for optimism about the future. The reports also list an encouraging­
ly wide range of development opportunities, that is, of new and 
more profitable ways of using given resources. To make use of them a 
re-arrangement of present resource-use patterns would be required but
27. Sinaga, Pengusahaan Karet Rakjat, p. 37.
28. Ibid., p . 36.
29. Ibid., p . 53.
30. Partosoedarso, Tata Produksi dan Niaga Kopi, p. 108.
31. Sinaga, Pengusahaan Karet Rakjat, p. 29.
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in no case would any great infusion of capital be necessary.
In the report on the sugar industry, it was shown that, despite 
the drastic decline in yields per hectare and all the other ineffi­
ciencies of the industry, the industry was nonetheless still able 
to produce sugar at a price below the then low price prevailing on 
the "free market."32 The report also makes a convincing case that, 
by paying higher rents and by using modern growing methods, the 
industry could become much more profitable than it has been in recent 
years.33 34 As Dr. Mubyarto has shown in his recent article on the 
sugar industry, there is plenty of money in the industry to pay the 
rents needed to get good quality land.31*
Agricultural extension (Bimas-type) projects can give very high 
returns if well done. Although the author of the Bimas report does 
not make any benefit-cost calculations, it can be assumed that 
benefit-cost ratios of 4 and more can be attained if the original 
principles of the scheme are adhered to.35
The most clearly defined set of development opportunities is 
given in the report on rubber production and marketing. One such 
opportunity has already been mentioned, namely the gains that could 
be obtained from planting selected rather than unselected seeds.
The authors estimate that, if such seeds (which are easy to produce 
and extremely cheap) had been made available to farmers, Indonesia's 
exports would have risen by at least $150 million a year by the end 
of the period 1950-1967.36 For many decades all the new planting 
and replanting done by the rubber estates has been done with selected 
and high-yielding seeds; in the smallholder sector all that is re­
quired is increased efficiency on the part of organizations whose 
task it is to serve the rubber smallholders.37
Other development opportunities include the use of stimulants, 
a method of increasing latex flow that has been fully proven since
32. Mubyarto, et^ . al. , Usahatani Tebu, p. 87. The rate of exchange 
used to make tKTs calculation was the BE rate, and the rupiah is 
overvalued at this rate.
33. Ibid. , p . 101.
34. Mubyarto, "The Sugar Industry," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic 
Studies, 5, No. 2 (1969).
35. "Penjuluh dan Petani" (Medan: Departemen Sosial-Ekonomi, Fakultas 
Pertanian, Universitas Sumatera Utara, forthcoming). In this 
study, benefit-cost calculations were made for six extension pro­
jects among which there were two that could be described as having 
been run according to the "original principles" of Bimas. In 
both cases a benefit-cost ratio of about 4 was found.
36. Sinaga, Pengusahaan Karet Rakjat, p. 28.
37. The authors report that selected planting materials were continu­
ously in short supply, and that even these meagre supplies were 
so poorly handled that germination rates averaged no more than
11 percent. Ibid. , p. 39.
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1955 and which gives a three-fold return on cost,38 and also the in­
creased returns that could be gained by returning to the production 
of higher grades of rubber.39 4012 The first development opportunity 
mentioned (stimulants) requires little capital and would be exploited 
quickly by the farmers if the materials were available locally, while 
a marked improvement in quality would soon occur once there had been 
a change in the "check price" system. As things stand, the domestic 
prices for rubber, unlike the world prices, do not reflect the costs 
of producing the higher grades, because, when the dollar prices for 
various grades of rubber are converted into rupiah at the going, and 
highly unfavorable, exchange rate, the rupiah returns from the sale 
of the higher grades are no longer enough to cover the costs of 
producing them. There is thus an economic incentive to produce low- 
quality and low-value rubber.1,0
It is also clear that farmers would plant, and produce, much 
more rubber if the rubber-rice price ratios were more favorable; 
such an improvement would occur in most regions merely after a change 
in exchange rate policy.1*1 The report indicates, too, that the rate 
of profit on investment in extension activities would be greater for 
rubber than it is for rice.1*2
The development opportunities in the processing sector of the 
rice industry are no doubt fewer than they are in the rubber industry, 
but the author shows that rice to the value of some $17 million could 
be saved each year if the technically more efficient rice mills were 
free of the restrictions they now face. At the time the study was 
done, only some 25 percent of the reduced processing capacity, in the
38. Ibid . , p . 25.
39. Ibid., p. 57.
40. The world prices for various grades of rubber reflect the dif­
ferential costs of producing rubber of high or low quality.
Under the "check price" system--a rather complicated arrangement 
that permitted exporters to sell the bulk of the foreign exchange 
proceeds only at the (low) official rate and the balance, the 
"overprice" at a higher rate--the rupiah an exporter could obtain 
from the sale of high quality rubber were not enough to cover the 
processing costs. When the check prices were set they were usual­
ly in proportion to the world prices for each grade, but when
the conversion into rupiah, at the prevailing (low) exchange 
rates, took place,the local currency proceeds were not enough to 
cover the costs of producing high-quality rubber. The check 
price system was abolished in 1970.
41. The rupiah was devalued in 1970, and exports are now, for the 
first time since independence, able to be sold at the most favor­
able current rate of exchange. Ibid. , p. 34.
42. From independence to the present day, the vast majority of the 
resources devoted to agricultural programs has been used to in­
crease rice production; whereas, there is strong evidence that 
the rate of return would be much higher if some, at least, of the 
men and money had been diverted to rubber, coconut, corn, etc., 
programs.
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form of rice mills, was in use.43
For coffee, the situation is similar. No clear-cut quality 
grades have been established to guide growers and processors, 44 and 
there have been no changes in production practices since 1930.45 
As with rubber, better prices and an extension program would lead 
to a good response from farmers.46
All the development opportunities listed here, and many of the 
others that .are not, have been available for ten, twenty or more 
years. The reason why they have not been used, or have been used on 
such a small scale, is that the economic environment has been con­
sistently unfavorable to innovation and to making best use of given 
resources.
Continuities in Economic Policy
Product markets are always unstable, and the profitability of 
given techniques or given products inevitably changes over time. But 
the climate for innovation and greater productivity has been unfavor­
able for so long that it is not possible to ascribe Indonesia's poor 
economic performance in the agricultural field to the influence of 
factors such as these. The explanation must instead be sought in the 
field of domestic policy making.
The reports give many indications that defective or misguided 
policies are the prime cause of the economic deterioration. Just why 
this should be so is an important, indeed a fascinating question, and 
one upon which the five reports throw a great deal of light. But it 
is also a complex question, and, in this section, attention will be 
given only to one aspect of the problem.
Three of the reports (on sugar, rubber and rice milling) stress 
the fact that the economic policies of independent Indonesia appear 
to be direct descendants of the policies pursued by the Dutch colonial 
government.
"Farmers have been 'exploited' long enough, since colonial times 
until now."47 In the colonial era, the peasants in Java were forced 
to grow cane or to rent land to the sugar factories at low prices, 
and the government officials were paid to assist the sugar companies.48
43. Prawirodihardjo, Perusahaan Pengolah Padi, p. 149.
44. Partosoedarso, Tata Produksi dan Niaga Kopi, p. 122.
45. Ibid. , p . 133.
46. It should be noted, however, that coffee is sold subject to 
international agreement, and the quotas are limited. But this 
should not prevent the introduction of innovations that reduce 
costs.
47. Mubyarto, et. al. , Usahatani Tebu, p. 90.
48. Ibid., p. 72.
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The sugar factories, now in government hands, still expect to get the 
land at a low price; the civil servants continue to play an "active 
role" in persuading the peasants to give up their rights in the land,49 50
and the law makes it their duty to do so.59
In the colonial era, sugar for domestic sale was heavily taxed 
in order to maximize the surplus for export. But it is still heavily 
taxed even though Indonesia has changed from being the second largest 
sugar exporter in the world (after Cuba) to an importer. The report 
suggests that, since circumstances have changed, a lowering of the 
taxes on sugar might help in the rehabilitation of the industry.51
In the late colonial era, rice mills were regulated to prevent 
food shortages in the patjeklik (pre-harvest) period, to ensure that 
the smal-1 farmers did not become indebted to the mills, and to encour­
age price "stability."52 534 These were the expressed aims of the regula­
tion, but it may also be assumed that the colonial government was 
also concerned with the level of prices, because the cost of producing 
export crops and of government itself would have risen had the rice 
price been higher. Since independence, and since 1952 in particular, 
the rice milling industry has been more severely regulated than it 
was in colonial times. The stated aims of the regulations are the 
same as they were in 1940, but the result has been that the capacity 
to produce of the industry's modern sector has declined, as has the 
extent to which the existing capacity is used. It is also safe to 
say that a prime reason for the regulations is similar to the reason 
given above for the colonial period, namely, that, if the industry 
were not controlled, the price of rice to civil servants and planta­
tion laborers would rise. 3
In the rubber industry for a number of years before the war, the 
Dutch, and imperialist interests generally, were protected by a heavy 
tax on smallholder rubber. This lessened the competition with planta­
tion rubber. As a result, the smallholders then got a return of but 
some 22 percent of the f.o.b. price for rubber.51* At the time the 
A.E.S. study was undertaken, the peasants received from 15 to 20 per­
cent of the (rupiah) f.o.b. price; the f.o.b. price had been converted 
into rupiah at the less favorable, BE, rate of exchange.55 During the
49. Ibid., pp. 55 and 72.
50. Ibid., pp. 124 ff.
51. In December 1966, only some 44 percent of the (government-con­
trolled) selling price was available to pay all the costs of pro­
ducing, refining and packaging sugar for sale. The remaining
56 percent was for taxes and various "funds." Ibid., p. 85.
52. Prawirodihardjo, Perusahaan Pengolah Padi, p. 125.
53. Ibid., p. 146. The report also comments that seasonal price vari­
ations are large and that there are great price differentials 
between one region and another. Ibid. , p. 147.
54. Sinaga, Pengusahaan Karet Rakjat, p. 53.
55. The figures that have just been given are for South Sumatra. The 
situation in South Kalimantan was somewhat better. For a partial 
explanation of the less favorable situation in South Sumatra, see
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same period the worst return received by smallholders in Malaysia was 
54 percent of the f.o.b. price.56 57
The continuity, or persistence, of policy from the colonial era 
to the present was emphasized only by the authors of the three studies 
cited; but continuities are observable in the other two reports as 
well. For coffee, the main "continuity" is that production methods 
have remained unchanged, as they have for rubber, and with agricultural 
extension, "continuity" can be discerned in the fact that fertilizer 
use has stil-1 not become habitual even though it was first used in 
the 1930's in most of the villages studied. 7
Earlier, it was shown that farmers respond in the ways that one 
might expect to the economic environment they face. The landowners 
in the -sugar growing areas are reluctant to rent their land because 
the rents are low, and the coffee growers expanded their production 
at a faster rate than the rubber smallholders because they were able 
to obtain a better price. The reports also show that there are many 
highly profitable but as yet little exploited ways of using available 
resources. It is not surprising to find that Indonesian farmers and 
traders are "subject to economic laws," for is not wealth in much 
shorter supply in Indonesia than in Australia or other developed 
countries? It is not the strength of economic forces that surprises 
but rather the poor performance of Indonesia's economy after the 
shackles of colonial rule had been thrown off.
The course of economic events after independence can be explained 
in part by the readiness of policy makers to cling to guidelines laid 
down in the colonial era--but to show these continuities is not to 
explain them, and the last substantive section of the article will 
be devoted to showing how the information from the reports can be 
used to explain why Indonesia's post-independence economic policies 
have taken the form they have.
Towards an Explanation of Economic Policy
For years Indonesia's economists urged that government policy in 
the economic field should take more account of Indonesia's economic 
realities. Their inability to suggest acceptable ways of arresting 
the economic decline or to change the course of economic policy 
during the Sukarno era (1945-1966) was no doubt due to political and 
social factors, and the Indonesian economists are well aware that 
this is so. As Professor M. Sadli of the University of Indonesia, 
and now Chairman of the Foreign Investment Board, remarked in 1961, 
"Both the economic theory of inflation and the economic policies 
needed to control it are easy to understand, but in practice it is
the article by M. Jaspan, "Tolerance and Rejection of Cultural 
Impediments to Economic Growth: The South Sumatran Case,"
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 3, No. 7 (June 1967).
56. Mubyarto, et. aJ., Usahatani Tebu, p. 50.
57. Soejono, Program "Bimas," pp. 98-99.
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difficult to control because it is less an economic problem than a 
socio-political problem wearing economic clothes."
Four of the A.E.S. reports are on apparently economic subjects 
(the exception is the Soejono report on Bimas), and the heads of all 
five research teams were trained as economists, yet each of the re­
ports helps to explain the socio-political dynamics of independent 
Indonesia.
Sajogyo, the Chairman of the Working Body of the Survey, is a 
sociologist. In guiding the work of each research team, he has 
emphasized that what are commonly regarded as purely economic facts 
have meaning far beyond the confines of economic theory and can be 
used to test hypotheses about social and political behavior. The 
clearest exposition of his basic position on this point is summed up 
in his s'tatement: "If you want to understand the economy of my
country, study our culture and our political system; if you want to 
understand our culture and our political system, study our economy."
Sajogyo does not suggest that his statement should be taken 
literally, for he recognizes that economic facts can still be given 
useful meaning by economists. But it is also clear that he feels 
that the analysis of economic facts will enable research workers to 
draw important conclusions about the political and cultural dynamics 
of Indonesian society.
The continuities in economic policy making discussed in the 
previous section provide convincing evidence that the structure of 
government in the first twenty years of the independence era must 
have been rather similar to that which existed under the colonial 
rulers. In the colonial era itself, Indonesia's alien rulers were 
able to use their political--and economic--power to ensure the main­
tenance of a very favorable economic situation for themselves.58
There were two main threads in colonial economic policies: the
first consisted of measures designed to maintain their commanding 
economic position and the second of a variety of measures designed 
to arrest the decline in economic welfare that had long been occurring 
in Java. These threads also dominated the thinking of policy makers 
in the 1945-1965 period.59 Of course, the government of independent 
Indonesia was no longer in the hands of aliens, but its top people 
were a small elite, and they believed strongly that it was the 
peasants' duty to serve the state. The government also believed 
that private wealth accumulation was somehow immoral and should be 
discouraged.
58. The Dutch were a small elite, some 0.36 percent of the total 
population (1930 Census). Polak calculated that in 1930 the 
Europeans earned 47 times as much per head than the Indonesians, 
and 61 times as much in 1939. J. J. Polak, The National Income 
of Netherlands East Indies, 1921-1939 (New York: n.p., 1943).
59. There were a number of policy makers of the period who espoused 
different views. Of these, the most prominent were probably 
Mr. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and Dr. Soemitro, both of whom lost 
whatever influence they may previously have had by joining the 
PRRI rebellion in 1958.
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The main differences between the late colonial era and the first 
twenty years of independence were that the Indonesian government was 
not able to maintain economic stability, and that the originally 
small government elite expanded about seven-fold. It should also be 
stressed that nowhere in the reports do the authors indicate that the 
unproductive, indeed destructive, economic policies pursued by 
the successive Sukarno governments were consciously or wittingly 
designed to serve the interests of the bureaucratic elite. The 
authors do not believe in the often popular "teovi k e d j a h a t a n or 
"wickedness theory of politics." Rather do they take the view that 
governments would not have done what they did had the policy makers 
been more aware of the consequences of their policy decisions.
Farmers do make careful economic calculations, and, since 
independence, have come more and more to desire to be able to deal 
on equal terms with the sugar factories and the government. Their 
desire to do so has increased despite "their full awareness that 
the mills are state property" because they are also aware of the 
"economic manipulations, the corruption, the misuse of authority, 
the assumed social superiority and the high living on the part of 
sugar factory staffs."60 Earlier, the disincentive effects of the 
low rents received by the peasant landowners was noted, as also was 
the role that government officials played in persuading them to give 
up their land-use rights at disadvantageous prices. It is therefore 
not surprising that only some 13 percent of the peasant landowners 
interviewed felt that the rental agreements were economically 
advantageous and that the remainder felt that they had been forced 
or compelled to rent their lands for sugar growing.61
Compulsion also plays its role in agricultural extension, a 
field where it might be anticipated that economic and educational 
factors would predominate. Earlier rice production programs had 
relied much on slogans and commands, but even the much better Bimas 
program relied to a considerable extent on perintah halus (gentle 
commands) from village and other officials.2 However, once the 
"pressure" to adopt the new inputs and practices had been removed, 
following the departure of the program personnel, rates of use fell 
sharply, indicating that the farmers were not convinced that the 
recommendations were indeed economically profitable.63
Taxes and regulations that severely reduced producer income and 
incentives to act in a developmental way were features of the rubber, 
coffee and rice milling industries as well. The taxes were rarely 
direct and usually took the form of wealth transfers through the 
operations of the price control and exchange rate systems. "If the 
government had used its tax revenue for development, [it] would not 
matter that the farmers were heavily taxed for the nation as a 
whole would benefit in the long run, [but] the staff of the sugar
60. Mubyarto, ejb. ad. , Usahatani Tebu, p. 38.
61. Ibid., p. 54. The tensions arising from this "exploitation" may 
be a partial explanation of the strength of the PKI in the 
sugar growing areas.
62. Soejono, Program "Bimas," p. 36.
63. Mubyarto, et. ad., Usahatani .Tebu, pp. 47-48.
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industry lived luxuriously, just as the foreigners did in the colonial 
days."6** The taxes collected from the other rural industries were 
often used in "non-productive" ways, too.
The present government has acknowledged that the economy was 
badly mismanaged under the previous government. The survey studies 
have indicated a wide range of development opportunities that could 
be used if the correct policies can be formulated. But these policies 
will be forthcoming only if the present generation of policy makers 
can come fully to understand the implications of the analyses made 
by the Agro-Economic Survey.
Above, the stress was on economic mismanagement and decline, but 
there was one encouraging feature of the post-independence economy 
that was- not noted by any of the research teams. At first glance, the 
destruction of capital in the rubber and rice milling industries was 
an unmixed economic loss. But the authors of both reports have indi­
cated that processing capacity in both industries rose rather than 
fell after independence. Existing capital assets were destroyed; the 
economy was always unstable; and the policy framework was, in a great 
number of ways, unfavorable for private investment. There nonetheless 
still remained enough incentive for private investors to save and to 
invest in remillings and rice hullers to the point where total oapaoity 
rose overall. The pity of it is that the opportunities for profit­
able investment consisted primarily of methods that were economical­
ly much less efficient than the techniques the new equipment was 
replacing, thus leading to a waste of resources.
Similarly, the long-continued mismanagement of the sugar industry 
did not deprive it of economic viability, as has already been noted.
But the gloomy clouds did not always have silver linings, as develop­
ments in the coffee industry and in the Bimas program showed.
In the coffee industry, the introduction of the coffee stamps 
system in the mid-1960's also led to additional investment in export 
businesses, but the aim of the new exporters, up from sixteen in 
1965 to forty-seven in 1967 (South Sumatra), 5 was not to trade in 
coffee but in the stamps themselves.66
The Bimas extension program is the third in a line of similar 
programs designed to increase rice output, but it, like the others, 
has become diluted. Such programs have usually worked well on a 
small scale (and this is encouraging for the future) but all have 
expanded rapidly because the government feels that it must do some­
thing for farmers, and along with the expansion comes lack of quality, 
manipulations and corruption. This all-too-quick conversion of a 
good program into, first, show business, and into monkey business 
not long after, indicates that the government has failed to understand 
the extent to which farmers are motivated by economic forces.67 The
6 4. Ibid. , p . 9 3.
65. Partosoedarso, Tata Produksi dan Niaga Kopi, p. 130.
66. Coffee stamps, which had to be bought, gave the right to export.
67. This statement is from a senior Indonesian agricultural official 
and is cited in the author’s "Development Opportunities in 
Indonesian Agriculture," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies,
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various production programs in the rice industry have suffered be­
cause "blanket recommendations," for all areas and types of farms, 
for fertilizer and pesticide use have been made; whereas, no farmer 
would make his own production plans on such a rough and ready basis.* 68
The lack of economic understanding possessed by policy makers 
also shows up in both the sugar and the rubber industries. In the 
first case, farmers have often been forbidden the right to plant 
cane on the grounds that the food supply in the area will become 
diminished. In the second, as has been mentioned above, the system 
of converting dollar prices for various grades of rubber into rupiah 
prices has systematically encouraged the production of the lower 
rather than the higher grades.69
The problems in a number of important agricultural industries 
have been clearly defined in the reports. The reports have also 
shown what could be done to make resource use more productive. They 
likewise give a number of indications of why certain policies went 
wrong and the policies that would need to be pursued to turn the 
opportunities into income. The authors sense, however, that it will 
probably not be easy to change the general direction of policy making 
in the way most conducive to development.
Some Unresolved Policy Problems
Indonesia has a land tenure problem--in Java in particular. 
Land ownership is very uneven, and the maldistribution of land 
ownership is compounded by a severe population problem. Policy 
makers have long stressed the need for land reform, yet the data 
from the Bimas study show that tenants and share-croppers also 
respond quite well to extension.70 Should land reform be retained 
as a policy goal, and, if so, what sort of land reform should be 
carried out? This study also indicates that where the program was 
successful land rents rose, which means that the agency which made 
the benefits possible is "subsidizing" the people who own rather 
than those who work the land.71 Does this mean that the taxation
3, No. 8 (October 1967), p. 59. Since that time the Bimas Gotong- 
Rojong programs (financed and executed by foreign companies,
CIBA, Hoechst, Mitsubishi, etc.) have been established, expanded 
rapidly and abolished. In the 1970-1971 main rice season the 
main rice production program will be Bimas jang Disempurnakan 
(Improved Bimas). This program was developed on a pilot basis 
(20,000 hectares) in the Jogjakarta region in 1969-1970. It 
is planned to cover 1.3 million hectares with the program in 
1970-1971.
68. Cf. Soejono, Program "Bimas," p. 53. Blanket, or national, 
recommendations are to be replaced with provincial, and hope­
fully local, recommendations from this year.
69. Sinaga, Pengusahaan Karet Rakjat, p. 62.
70. Soejono, Program "Bimas," p. 60.
71. Ibid.
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system should be altered or that a land reform is indeed necessary?
The Bimas and the sugar studies both assume that self-sufficiency 
in rice and sugar would be sound economic policy for Indonesia, but, 
in the areas where sugar is grown, rice competes with sugar, and, as 
has been shown, greater economic benefits might be obtained more 
quickly from concentration of scarce resources in the rubber and 
coffee industries than in either the sugar or the rice industries.
It is likely, however, that the government will retain self-sufficiency 
as a goal and devote most of its scarce capital and extension resources 
to the latter industries.
The different rental systems that have been tried in the sugar 
industry reflect different views of the technical and economic capa­
bilities’ of the peasants. Two of the "systems" assume that small 
farmers could become competent sugar growers, and two do not. The 
sugar companies themselves continue to prefer the system (cash rent) 
which gives them complete control over the land during the growing 
period.72 There is some evidence that farmers can become competent 
cane growers, but the argument between the industry and the peasants 
still seems to be conducted on an all-or-nothing basis.
Government instrumentalities still retain a strong desire to 
control the distribution of certain commodities, rice and sugar in 
particular,73 74 and this desire to control often exceeds the desire to 
ensure that the best means possible are used to increase output and 
national income.
The rice milling study showed that the large processing firms 
(the rice mills) paid prices that were no worse than those paid by 
the operators of other rice processing facilities71* and undermined, 
thereby, the argument of two decades that the mills had to be closely 
controlled because they possessed monopsony power. Yet the author 
argues later that the establishment of the smaller hullers rather 
than the building of new mills should be encouraged on the grounds 
that permits to build and operate the former would be easier to get 
than for the latter.75
In the rubber study, there is an even more spectacular example 
of the extent to which the general ideas that informed policy making 
were mistaken owing to the seeming inability of policy makers to 
think in economic--or business--terms. "We have been worrying need­
lessly for years about the future of natural rubber, but the supply 
price of our rubber is still but a fraction of the world price," be­
cause the cost of labor is much lower in Indonesia than in Malaysia 
and rubber production is a labor intensive industry.76 Later, he 
points out that the future for natural rubber in Indonesia should be
72. Mubyarto, ejt. ad. , Usahatani Tebu, p. 43.
73 . Ibid . , p . 50 .
74. Prawirodihardjo, Perusahaan Pengolah Padi, p. 137.
75. Ibid., p . 156.
76. Sinaga, Pengusahaan Karet Rakjat, p. 13 (the quotation has been 
paraphrased).
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better than for Malaysia, "and they have confidence in the future 
there."77 As has been pointed out above, the on-farm prices were 
very low and production stagnated, but, if the necessary and very 
simple calculations had been made in dollars rather than in rupiah, 
it would have been obvious long ago that the rubber industry repre­
sented a valuable economic resource.
The expressed policy aims have always been to increase produc­
tion, to bopst exports, and to protect the small man.78 But the 
reports have shown over and over that these laudable policy aims are 
a self-deception on the part of policy makers and that, with few 
exceptions (of which the original Bimas is probably the most important), 
the policies followed since independence have made it more rather 
than less difficult to reverse the unfavorable economic trends of the 
colonial period.
The perceptiveness of the reports on the dynamics of economic 
policy making is not accidental. I would, however, be the first to 
acknowledge that the particular interpretations that have been put on 
the data are my own and that the authors of the reports could well 
disagree with me on one or mere of them. The important point, however, 
is that the data needed for an analysis of this crucial question would 
have been difficult if not impossible to get had the studies not been 
undertaken.
When the studies were designed, care was taken to ensure that 
information would be collected from representatives of all groups 
that have a direct economic interest in whatever happens in particular 
industries. After all, it is people who make economic decisions, and, 
in any society, the terms on which economic exchanges take place 
between the various interest groups play a profound role in determining 
not only the shape of the economy itself but also the quality of social 
and political life.
In the sugar study, information was collected from farmers, 
officials and people who work for the sugar industry. In the Bimas 
study, the information sources were farmers and officials, including 
extension workers. For the rubber study, information was collected 
from farmers, traders, processors and officials, and the same was 
true for the coffee study. For the rice milling study the information 
sources were farmers, officials and processors.
All the studies were designed to permit the analysis of the rela­
tionships between important social groups. Most of the specific 
information collected was apparently "economic," but, as has been 
shown, this information could be used to illuminate problems broader 
than those normally studied by economists.
The Reports Reviewed
It is the essence of the work done by the Agro-Economic Survey 
that the quality of the relationships between social groups should
77. Ibid. , p. 22.
78. For two good statements of this, see Ibid. , p. 14 and 
Prawirodihardjo, Perusahaan Pengolah Padi, p. 146.
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be the focus of each study. The insistence on the use of research 
designs that permit this is probably the single most important 
methodological contribution made by the Survey.
Other contributions undoubtedly include the policy recommenda­
tions that have been submitted to the agencies that commissioned each 
study. As has been noted earlier, some of these recommendations have 
been put into effect, with generally fruitful results, and the Survey, 
originally scheduled to run for two years, is now in its fifth year 
of operation.
After everything that has been said so far, it may now seem a 
little invidious to note some deficiencies in the reports. The 
deficiencies, some of which were unavoidable, do not, however, de­
tract much from the value the reports so clearly possess.79
The research workers had to struggle with secondary data 
that were often inaccurate. For example, the estimates for domestic 
consumption of coffee range from 21,000 to 68,000 tons.80 A related 
difficulty was faced by the group that did the sugar study: one
agency proved very reluctant to provide information essential to the 
study on the grounds that it was a "business secret."81
The individual studies also display a number of methodological 
and analytical weaknesses which, while not serious, detract somewhat 
from the scientific value of the reports. In two of the reports (on 
rice and on coffee), it is assumed that point estimates of costs of 
production, for hand-pounding of rice and for peasant coffee, can be 
made, and this assumption led to the creation of data that have 
spurious accuracy at best.
In the report on rubber, stress is laid on the slow rate of new 
planting, and much of the analysis is concerned with showing why this 
should be so, yet the survey data show that the rate of new planting
79. Earlier it was noted that most of the research workers were young 
and had not had much research experience. To ensure that the 
work was well done, the Agro-Economic Survey scheduled regular 
workshops and training courses. At these meetings, all the work 
that had been done so far, and all plans for future work, were 
subject to close scrutiny by the members of the other research 
teams, by Professor Sajogyo, and, from time to time, by research 
consultants (Dr. E. de Vries in particular). An account of one 
such training course and how it affected the quality of the work 
done by the A.E.S. is, David H. Penny, "The Tjiawi Training 
Center" in The Research Process (forthcoming), pp. 128-181. (The 
reports are marred by various typing and proofreading errors.
The most serious are in Mubyarto, et^ . al. , Usahatani Tebu, p. 16 
and Partosoedarso, Tata Produksi dan Niaga Kopi, p. l'S 1 . But there 
are others in each of the reports.)
80. Four sources, estimates for 1966. Partosoedarso, Tata Produksi 
dan Niaga Kopi, p. 113. Other major statements on the same sub­
ject are found on Ibid., p. 103 and Sinaga, Pengusahaan Karet 
Rakjat, p. 18.
81. Mubyarto, et. al., Usahatani Tebu, p. 102.
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by the farmers interviewed was quite a good deal higher than the 
official figures would suggest. 2 The analytical implications of 
this discrepancy are not, however, commented upon.
As has already been noted, the research designs were in general 
excellent. But the Bimas study would have provided data that are 
more useful and more convincing if a somewhat more complicated 
research design had been used. This study would have been improved 
had the team collected data from an extra two villages, where the 
Bimas program had operated only in the 1964-1965 crop season,82 3 84 and 
if it had included more information from and about the extension 
workers rather than relying for the most part on information showing 
what happened on the farms.
In his foreword, Minister Tojib emphasizes the need to describe 
the socio-economic diversity but in many reports data showing ranges 
in variability in certain key parameters are not given. For example, 
the sugar study gives no information on the actual rents received by 
the farmers even though it is hinted that these do vary from place 
to place.811 In the Bimas study, the data for the control villages 
are only for one season; whereas, the study used data for up to 
four seasons from the other villages.85 In the rice milling study, 
point estimates were given for the milling out-turn from various 
methods and also for the costs of each method, even though it is 
inevitable that these will vary widely for one reason or another.86
Opportunities for needed economic analyses were sometimes over­
looked. In the Bimas study the use of fertilizer is several times 
justified on agronomic grounds alone,87 and, in the rice milling 
study, projections for investment in processing facilities are made 
only in physical terms and no economic calculations are made.88 
The research workers also had to struggle with some conceptual 
problems, for example, the best definitions to give to such technical 
terms as "income" and "commercialization."
The reports also vary widely in readability. They were written 
for policy makers and interested laymen, and it may be taken for 
granted that most of these men lack the academic background and 
training of the authors. It is likely that the readers from the 
agencies that sponsored the studies would have found the rubber, 
rice milling and coffee study reports sufficiently easy to understand,
82. Sinaga, Pengusahaan Karet Rakjat, p. 33.
83. There were three "treatments"--no Bimas, Bimas once (1965- 
1966), and Bimas twice (1964-1965 and 1965-1966). But, as 
the author pointed out, Bimas 1965-1966 was a very different 
sort of program from Bimas 1964-1965.
84. Mubyarto, £t. aJ. , Usahatani Tebu, p. 48.
85. Soejono, Program "Bimas," p. 42.
86. Prawirodihardjo, Perusahaan Pengolah Padi, pp. 131 and 135.
87. Soejono, Program "Bimas," pp. 54 and 67.
88. Prawirodihardjo, Perusahaan Pengolah Padi, p. 156.
130
but they would have had some difficulties with the other two (Bimas 
and sugar). In these two cases, the difficulties would be due to the 
length of the reports, to the quality of the writing and the develop­
ment of theme, and to the way in which unfamiliar technical terms are 
used.
A most welcome feature of the reports on the other hand is that 
the research methods used have been exposed to the public gaze, 
occasionally in the body of the text but more often in detailed 
appendices. This helps interested readers to evaluate the studies, 
and it also helps people who are planning to undertake similar 
studies. There is much of value for students of research methods in 
each and every one of the studies reviewed here.
In,closing, I should reiterate that the weaknesses are far out­
weighed by the strengths of the reports, whether taken individually 
or as a group. The field studies of the Agro-Economic Survey have 
made a magnificent contribution towards a better understanding of 
Indonesia's "agro-economy" and to the formation of a sounder basis 
for policy making for development.
